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ELECTRONIC COMMERCE SYMPOSIUM
CLASH OF THE TITANS: REGULATING THE
COMPETITION BETWEEN ESTABLISHED AND
EMERGING ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS
By Jane Kaufman Winnt
ABSTRACT
This article equates the providers of traditional electronic payment
services with the Titans of Greek mythology, and the providers of new
electronic payment technologies with the Olympians. Professor Winn
concludes, however, that unlike the Titans of Greek mythology, these
modern Titans appear to be winning in their battle with the upstart
Olympians.
This article describes the fundamental characteristics of payment
systems, reviews the applicable law, and describes the new technologies
that were, until quite recently, expected to displace older electronic pay-
ment systems. Professor Winn finds that consumers and merchants, by
and large, are happy with the existing regulatory structure. And, because
of the failure of new technologies to gain significant market share yet,
regulators have not yet been obliged to revise existing regulations to take
account of these new technologies.
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Banks are dinosaurs. We can bypass them.
- Bill Gates1
The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.
- Mark Twain
2
I. INTRODUCTION: CLASH OF THE TITANS
One Greek myth tells the tale of an earlier generation of gods, the Ti-
tans, who fought with a later generation of gods, the Olympians, for sov-
ereignty over the earth.3 The Titans were the offspring of Uranus, the sky,
and Mother Earth. The Olympian gods were the children of Cronus, the
king of the Titans. Mother Earth had helped Cronus overthrow his father
and seize power. Cronus feared that one of his own sons would likewise
dethrone him, so he swallowed each of his own children as soon as they
were born. It was not until the sixth child, Zeus, was born that Cronus's
1. Michael Meyer, Culture Club, NEWSWEEK, July 11, 1994, at 38.
2. Cable from Mark Twain to The Associated Press (June 2, 1897).
3. This account is taken from 1 ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK MYTHS 37-44
(1955).
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wife, the Titaness Rhea, conspired with Mother Earth to find a way to save
the child from his father. When Zeus was grown, with the help of his
mother and his wife, he tricked Cronus into drinking an emetic potion,
causing him to vomit up his first five children. They were now fully
grown, and these Olympian gods joined Zeus in his battle to wrest control
of the earth from Cronus and the Titans. The Olympians and Titans fought
bitterly for ten years, but the Olympian gods finally won, as had been
prophesied by Mother Earth.
The explosive impact of new communications and information proc-
essing technology in recent years has triggered a conflict for market domi-
nance between established and emerging players that resembles the clash
of the Titans and the Olympians in sound and fury, if not in cosmic rele-
vance. In the marketplace for electronic payment services, the Titans are
played by the regulated financial institutions and the Olympians are played
by the emerging payment technology start-ups. The role of Mother Earth
is played by consumers, who have not yet made the decision to throw out
the Titans and bring in the Olympians. As a result, regulators have no
clear mandate. Rather, they face the ambiguous and complex task of
maintaining the efficacy of existing regulatory efforts in the face of
changing circumstances while not discriminating unfairly between either
Titans or Olympians.
In the first round of the struggle for dominance in the market for pay-
ment services supporting Internet-based commerce, the Titans have
emerged victorious while the Olympians are in full retreat. While only a
few years ago, it appeared that systems built to leverage new global elec-
tronic networks such as the Internet might sweep away the cumbersome
older generation of electronic payment systems, this has not proven to be
the case. 4 Consumers have shown a profound lack of interest in the radi-
cally new electronic payment systems developed by the Olympians. U.S.
consumers actually seem quite happy with the range of electronic payment
options currently available. As long as the Olympians continue to neglect
the interests of the consumers and other stakeholders in emerging elec-
tronic commerce markets, the less novel, but more serviceable, offerings
of the Titans will continue to prevail in the market for electronic payment
services.
4. On the side of the visionaries, see, for example, DANIEL C. LYNCH & LESLIE
LUNDQUIST, DIGITAL MONEY: THE NEW ERA OF INTERNET COMMERCE (1996). On the
side of the more jaded observers, see Martin Mayer, Playing Payments Poker, INSTI-
TUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1998, at 49.
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The Olympians may yet be gearing up for a second assault. This wave,
though, may focus on utilizing the existing Titan infrastructure through
new, Olympian interfaces. As a countermeasure, the Titans may harness
Olympian technology. Regardless of the outcome of this battle, the future
seems to be one of hybrid systems, where Titan infrastructure is accessed
via Olympian technology.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Payments are a specialized subset of commercial transactions. Pay-
ment systems promote commerce by transferring value quickly and effec-
tively and by imposing a minimum of additional costs or risks on the
transacting parties. Payment services support transactions in goods and
other services as well as transfers of value between financial institutions
and their customers. Payment systems operate at the short-term end of the
spectrum for financial services, providing rapid and certain transfers of
value. They must be efficient, pervasive, and trustworthy in order to
minimize the costs that the payment function adds. Any new electronic
payment system technologies must not only offer innovative features, they
must continue to meet these basic requirements. A payment system can be
described in terms of liquidity, finality, transaction risk and systemic risk.
A. Liquidity
Liquidity is commonly defined as the ease with which an asset can be
bought or sold for money.5 With the exception of the FedWire,6 electronic
payment systems are not themselves money, but represent a private sub-
stitute for money that is acceptable to the transactors. A private payment
system substitute for legal tender has liquidity if other types of assets can
be converted into and out of that payment medium without causing sig-
nificant distortions in the market value of the asset solely attributable to
the choice of payment device. This type of payment device liquidity can
be achieved when there is a sufficiently large number of transactors in the
market and transactors can settle transactions in the payment device with-
out making major modifications in other terms of the transaction in order
to do so.
5. See ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, EQUITY MARKETS: STRUCTURE, TRADING, AND
PERFORMANCE 523 (1988).
6. FedWire is the wholesale funds transfer system operated by the Federal Reserve
Banks. Since the obligations of the Federal Reserve Banks are the legal tender of the
U.S., a credit on the books of the Fed that results from a FedWire transfer is also money
in the sense of legal tender in the U.S.
[Vol. 14:675
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B. Finality
Payment systems differ widely in the degree of finality associated with
their use. Final payment is the moment when the payment may no longer
be revoked.7 The rules governing finality of a particular payment device
must be clear and universally applied in order to minimize the transaction
costs associated with the choice of the payment device. Certainty about the
degree of finality, whether great or small, is an essential element of estab-
lished payment systems. 8 Although the importance of finality of payments
is obvious when payment transactions are viewed in aggregate as a pay-
ment system, rules governing finality may be difficult to enforce in prac-
tice because of competing concerns at the level of individual transactions.
A payer will normally prefer less finality because it can enjoy the float
while the payment is processed, and it can reverse payment in the event of
a dispute with the payee. 9 Merchants obviously prefer a system with more
finality, as it gives the merchant the benefit of the float and reduces the
risk that settlement will be revoked once made.' 0 In addition, the party
providing the payment service may wish to make exceptions to finality
7. See LARY LAWRENCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT SYSTEMS 336 (1997).
Payment by cash in many respects sets the standard for finality, since once cash has been
exchanged for another asset, the purchaser has no power other than persuasion to recover
the cash. Many forms of electronic funds transfers have the same high degree of finality,
but credit card transactions can be unwound weeks or even months after the transaction
has taken place due to the statutory right of the card holder to contest charges that appear
on periodic statements. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. pt. 226.12 (1998)
(special credit card provisions, including liability for unauthorized use), id. pt. 226.13
(1998) (billing error resolution provisions). Payment by check is more final than payment
by credit card, but nevertheless can still be reversed if the drawer of the check manages to
instruct the drawee of the check to refuse payment before the check has actually cleared.
See U.C.C. § 4-403 (1996) (customer's right to stop payment).
8. See Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Int'l, 570 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1991)
("[The] concern for finality in business transactions has long been a significant policy
consideration in this State. In a different but pertinent context, we observed in Hatch v.
Fourth National Bank, 147 N.Y. 184, 192, 41 N.E. 403 [N.Y. Ct. App. 1895] that 'to
permit in every case of payment of a debt an inquiry as to the source from which the
debtor derived the money, and a recovery if shown to have been dishonestly acquired,
would disorganize all business operations and entail an amount of risk and uncertainty
which no enterprise could bear."').
9. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANS-
ACTIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 117 (1999).
10. Electronic funds transfers, unlike credit cards, generally have a high degree of
finality. For that reason, debit cards as a point-of-sale EFT device are very popular with
merchants and much less popular with consumers who are accustomed to enjoying the
float when they make payments from their bank accounts using checks. Id.
19991
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rules for established clients or in other hard cases." Thus, unless sup-
ported by clear legal rules that leave parties little room for discretion, fi-
nality of payment will be difficult to enforce consistently and fairly.
12
C. Transaction risk
When payment is not in the form of a proffer of legal tender, there is
an element of credit risk for the party accepting the payment. Even with a
payment of legal tender, there is a risk of error in processing the transac-
tion, or of fraud such as forgery. Transacting parties make choices about
which forms of payment are acceptable in part based on these transaction
risks. Credit cards may have the lowest form of finality of any major mod-
em form of payment; however, they also have the lowest credit risk for the
merchants accepting them, provided the merchant obtains prior authoriza-
tion for a charge. This is because under credit card system rules, card issu-
ers, not merchants, bear the risk that the cardholder cannot pay. 13 Paper-
based payment systems incorporate processes to reduce fraud losses that
historically have kept forgery losses within manageable levels. These in-
clude the use of magnetic ink printing, comparison of signatures with




What is recognized as money in modem economies is rarely legal ten-
der. It is instead a complex fabric of claims on private organizations that
circulate with almost the same degree of acceptance as legal tender. Given
the large amount of payments made in reliance on the creditworthiness of
private parties, the safety and soundness of participants in the payment
system is a paramount concern of regulators. Failure of a major compo-
11. For example, U.C.C. § 4-208(c) provides that a drawee bank may not shift the
loss caused by a fraudulent indorsement or alteration of a check onto a third party who
negotiated the check if the drawee bank's own customer's negligence made it possible for
the fraud to occur. See LAWRENCE, supra note 7 at 249.
12. For example, the National Automated Clearing House Association just revised
its system rules to provide for the first time for fines for clearing house members who fail
to perform their assigned roles within the deadlines established by the rules. See
NATIONAL AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION, 1999 ACH RULES: A
COMPLETE GUIDE TO RULES & REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK at R2
(1999).
13. For a general explanation of the nature of credit card transactions, see
LAWRENCE, supra note 7 at 513-515.
14. With advances in desktop publishing, however, many of these traditional obsta-
cles on forgery are eroding rapidly.
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nent of the payment system would cause disruption throughout the econ-
omy, imposing unforeseen losses on unprepared parties. If the failure is
large enough to affect liquidity, it could cause a contraction in the level of
economic activity generally. As a result, regulators must evaluate not only
the degree to which participants in the payment system observe the system
rules but also the likelihood that a system participant would fail to meet its
obligations to other system participants. The regulators should also evalu-
ate whether the system could withstand the failure of a major participant.
There is no major payment system in the U.S. today that is not subject
to a significant level of supervision. 15 Radically new payment systems
may fall outside the purview of existing payment system regulations, so
they pose a potential threat to the safety and soundness of existing pay-
ment systems if the interface between new and old payment systems is not
managed carefully. 16 Furthermore, it is unclear whether regular consumers
of regulated financial services are in a position to understand and evaluate
the risks of new payment systems, even if existing payment services can
be sheltered from the risk of insolvency or illiquidity associated with new
payment systems. Because failure of any payment device widely accepted
in the market may impose unacceptable levels of costs (even on those
market participants who did not accept the payment device directly), the
model of self regulation and government restraint advocated in the
15. Payment systems that are part of the banking system, such as the check clearing
system and funds transfer systems, are subject to a higher degree of government oversight
than payment systems run outside the banking system, such as the credit card system. The
credit card industry is still subject to some oversight at the level of card issuer-card
holder relations pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act.
16. This represents a variation of "Herstatt risk," which refers to the risk that foreign
exchange traders or other money market participants assume when they fulfill their obli-
gations to counterparts without requiring the counterpart to fulfill its obligations simulta-
neously. Herstatt risk is named after the German bank, Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt K.G.a.A.,
that was closed in 1974 by regulators before it settled its foreign exchange obligations to
other banks. See Raj Bhala, Self Regulation in Global Electronic Markets Through Rein-
vigorated Trade Usages, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 863, 867 n.7 (1995). If a bank offers its cus-
tomers a choice of various payments services, and assumes on behalf of its clients the risk
that any one of those systems will fail to settle, the bank will be exposed to a risk that
obligations under each payment system will not in fact be settled at the end of the trading
day due to time zone and operating time differences. This is similar to the risk banks face
in foreign currency markets that obligations denominated in different currencies will not
be settled at the end of the trading day if there are significant differences between oper-
ating times of the payment systems.
1999]
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Framework for Global Electronic Commerce ("Magaziner Report") 17
must be viewed with some skepticism in the context of payment systems.
III. TRADITIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS: THE TITANS
Consumer payment systems in the U.S. are still dominated by tradi-
tional paper-based services; only a tiny proportion of total payments are
currently electronic. Furthermore, these proportions are expected to
change only slowly. In 1997, paper-based payment systems still domi-
nated the market for consumer payment services in the U.S. i" Wholly
electronic payment systems currently account for a trivially small propor-
tion of the total market for consumer payment services. 19
A. Check clearing
Banks in the U.S. have been anticipating the advent of the "checkless
society" for decades, hoping to replace expensive check processing serv-
ices with more efficient electronic funds transfer services. 2 Yet checks
remain the largest segment of the U.S. payment system, and the volume of
checks used continues to increase, although the rate of increase is slowing
down. No one anticipates that checks will be displaced by electronic pay-
ment systems as the dominant form of payment in the U.S. in the near fu-
17. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CLINTON AND ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR
GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1997), available at <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/
eleccomm/ecomm.htm>.
18. In 1997, personal checks accounted for 52.37% of the dollar volume of con-
sumer payments, and 32.32% of the total number of transactions, while cash accounted
for 17.43% by dollar volume and 40.76% by number of transactions. When other paper-
based payment devices such as money orders, travelers checks, official checks (including
cashier's checks, teller checks and certified checks) and food stamps are added, 73.36%
of all consumer payments by dollar amount, and 75.49% by volume were paper-based.
Consumer Payment Systems, THE NILSON REPORT, Nov. 1998, at 8.
19. Pre-authorized electronic funds transfers, such as direct deposit of payroll, or
payments authorized online or by telephone, accounted for only 2.51% by dollar volume
and 1.13% by number of transactions of the total. Card-based payments, which may be
electronic or may rely on paper processes, accounted for 24.14% of dollar volume, and
23.39% by transaction volume of the total. Credit cards accounted for the largest amount
of card-based payments, with 21.12% by dollar volume and 17.99% of transaction vol-
ume, with debit cards at 2.78% and 3.69% respectively. Stored value cards, which in the
U.S. consist primarily of phone cards, accounted only for 0.14% of dollar volume and
1.51% of transaction volume, and electronic government benefit cards accounted for only
0.10% of dollar volume and 0.20% of transaction volume. Id.
20. See Bill Orr, The Great Card Question: Will It Be Smart Or Debit?, ABA
BANKING J., Sept. 1998, at 54.
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ture. As long as checks are the payment device of choice for both consum-
ers and businesses, regulated financial institutions will have to maintain a
considerable investment in the equipment and services required to process
huge numbers of pieces of paper.
Businesses and consumers remain committed to checks as a payment
device because they are more flexible than electronic payment devices in
many respects. Any name can be written on the payee line of a check, in-
cluding the name of a complete stranger. In principle, checks can be writ-
ten for any amount, no matter how large or small. The drawer of the check
enjoys the float until the check finally clears, and may stop payment until
it does.21 The bank must normally absorb the cost of forged checks, pro-
vided the customer has not contributed to the forgery through his or her
negligence. 22 Because the volume of data captured during the processing
of transactions in the check collection system is minimal, 23 personal data
regarding checking account customers and their transactions is less likely
to be exploited for secondary uses than the more substantial personal data
generated or stored in electronic payment systems such as credit card and
debit card systems- Finally, U.S. banks did such a brilliant job of market-
ing the canceled check as the best record of a transaction that many bank
customers will not permit their banks to stop sending canceled checks with
their monthly statements. The legacy of this marketing campaign has
come back to haunt the banks as they struggle to wean their customers
from their dependence on pieces of paper in payment transactions. Before
U.S. bank customers will willingly surrender their checking accounts for
wholly electronic payment services, they will have to be persuaded that
the newer, more efficient electronic services offer an equivalent combina-
tion of low price, convenience and insurance against risk of loss.
21. See U.C.C. § 4-403.
22. See U.C.C. §§ 3-401, 3-403, 3-406, 3-418.
23. The only electronic data processed by checks is in the MICR line at the bottom
of the check, which reflects the limitations of computers in the 1950s when it was intro-
duced. The MICR line includes the customer's bank's routing number, the customer's
account number, the number of the check and the amount of the check. Unlike credit and
debit card systems, the MICR line does not permit the payee's identity to be processed
automatically. The check collection system permits the automated calculation of the cus-
tomer's balance, but does not support the retention of the same volume of transaction
information by the service provider that the credit and debit card processing systems do.
1999]
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The development of check guarantee services such as TeleCheck 24
have increased the willingness of merchants to accept checks, reducing
transaction risks associated with accepting checks and making checks an
even more liquid payment device for both consumers and businesses.
Systemic risks do not normally arise in the context of the check collection
system because of the small average amount of payments made by checks
relative to the net worth of the banks providing the service and because of
the "midnight deadline" rule, which gives banks more than twenty-four
hours to make the decision whether to honor a check25.
B. Wholesale funds transfers
The largest segment of the U.S. payment system, when measured by dollar
volume transferred, is the wholesale funds transfer market, which transfers
trillions of dollars a day.26 By contrast, the market for electronic funds
transfers by individuals is much smaller in dollar volume, though the
number of individual check and credit card transactions dwarfs the number
of wholesale funds transfers. 27 It was in the formation of electronic funds
transfer systems that regulated financial institutions first developed the
business processes necessary to support the secure electronic transmission
of customer instructions regarding funds transfers.
28
Although funds transfers conducted over funds transfer facilities
maintained by the Federal Reserve Banks were subject to the regulation of
the Federal Reserve Board, many funds transfers took place over private
systems, such as the Clearing House for Interbank Payment Systems
("CHIPS" ).2 The entire wholesale funds transfer system was not governed
24. See TeleCheck, TeleCheck Homepage, (visited April 20, 1999)
<http://www.telecheck.com>. See also For a fee, service takes the worry out of checks,
ARIZ. Bus. GAZETTE, May 11, 1995, at 22.
25. See U.C.C. §§ 4-104(a)(10); 4-214(a); 4-215(a).
26. See 2 FURASH & Co., BANKING'S ROLE IN TOMORROW'S PAYMENTS SYSTEM,
46, 61 (1994) (study prepared for the Banking Research Fund on behalf of the Payments
System Committee of the Bankers Roundtable).
27. In 1993, there were about 70 million FedWire funds transfers and 61 billion
checks processed. Id. at 10, 46. There were 7.7 billion electronic funds transfers made in
1993 using ATM and ACH networks. Id. at 97. Although 95% of these transfers were
made through ATM machines, id., the popularity of direct debit and direct deposit
through ACH networks, and point-of-sale EFTs have grown rapidly in recent years.
28. For a discussion of the significance of closed network electronic commerce as it
developed in the market for funds transfers, see Jane Kaufman Winn, Couriers Without
Luggage: Negotiable Instruments and Digital Signatures, 49 S.C. L. REv. 739, 757
(1998).
29. For background on CHIPS, see 2 FURASH & Co., supra note 26, at 61-65.
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by a clear body of law until U.C.C. Article 4A was promulgated in 1989
and adopted by the states shortly thereafter. 30 The Article 4A drafting pro-
cess resulted in many innovations, even though it drew heavily on the
practices that had developed among banks and their customers during the
15 years before the drafting committee was established. While a consensus
was not easy to achieve, the community of interests shared by both the
banks and their customers permitted the drafting process to find workable
compromises on many thorny issues.
31
Wholesale funds transfers in general, and the FedWire system in par-
ticular, are highly liquid payment media with a high degree of payment
finality and low transaction risks. Transfers of funds over the FedWire are
irrevocable when received and settlement is immediate.32 Systemic risk
issues are raised when wholesale funds transfers are accomplished outside
the FedWire system, such as through the CHIPS system where net settle-
ment occurs at the end of the trading day. CHIPS maintains a series of
controls to minimize the risk that one financial institution may fail to settle
its obligations at the end of the trading day, triggering a chain reaction of
failures that could cause the collapse of the national financial system.
33
Although U.C.C. Article 4A recognizes the possibility that a funds transfer
30. See Prefatory Note, U.C.C. Article 4A (1995).
31. One basic premise regarding funds transfer law was not modified during the
drafting process: the price paid by users of the funds transfer system should not include
any substantial risk premium to compensate those harmed by many common forms of
fraud or error. Regular users of the wholesale funds transfer system did not want to pay a
risk-adjusted price for the service, preferring instead to take responsibility for fraud and
error prevention and paying only a nominal price to transfer large amounts of money over
a system with a very high degree of finality. This decision to keep risk-pooling at a
minimum and force each participant, whether bank or customer, to take primary respon-
sibility for fraud and error losses, is well suited to a wholesale market where only sophis-
ticated players are present. It is a complete departure from the paternalistic risk manage-
ment model used in the consumer credit card system.
32. See 2 FURASH & CO., supra note 26, at 45.
33. These controls include bilateral credit limits, which limit the net amount of
credit each financial institution will accept from every other participant, and sender net
debt caps, which are limits on the maximum debit position any participant may maintain
during a trading day. In addition, the financial condition of members of CHIPS is moni-
tored, and sophisticated technological controls are maintained over communications
within the system. See 2 FURASH & CO., supra note 26 at 63-65.
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system like CHIPS might fail to settle,34 in fact CHIPS has never failed to
settle since it began operation in 1972.35
C. Credit cards
Credit cards are more than simple payment devices-they provide di-
rect access to a line of credit. While the credit is important in its own right,
it has larger implications as well. The financial institutions that sign up
either cardholders or merchants are functioning as financial intermediar-
ies, and by providing that intermediating function, minimize the risk to the
transacting parties. The intermediaries charge for these services through a
discount rate charged to merchants and through interest charges and serv-
ice fees charged to cardholders. Because the credit card system is a closed
system, in which no one can participate as a cardholder, merchant, card
issuer or financial intermediary without agreeing to be bound by the sys-
tem rules, the fact that a merchant accepts credit cards provides consumers
with a guarantee of recourse in the event of a dispute in the underlying
transaction. Similarly, the card issuer screens cardholder's creditworthi-
ness for merchants.
The market for credit cards gained momentum in the 1960s when
some major banks started marketing them aggressively. The banks that
were most aggressive sought to minimize their own risk associated with
wholesale distribution of credit cards through the use of overreaching form
contract terms. This lead to a widespread perception that cardholders
needed protections in law. The result was Regulation Z,36 which represents
a high water mark in U.S. consumer protection law. Regulation Z prohibits
the mailing out of unsolicited credit cards, 37 limits cardholder liability for
unauthorized transactions that occur before the card issuer is notified of
the problem to a flat $50,38 requires the issuer to send periodic statements
to the cardholder and requires the issuer to provide certain dispute and er-
ror resolution services. 39 The result of these regulations is that credit cards
have less finality than almost any other payment device.
34. See U.C.C. Article 4A prefatory note. See also U.C.C. §§ 4A-404, 4A-405
(beneficiary's bank may delay acceptance of a payment order until after it has received
payment).
35. See 2 FURASH & CO., supra note 26, at 64.
36. 14 C.F.R. pt. 226 (1998).
37. See id. pt. 226.12(a).
38. See id. pt. 226.12(b).
39. See id. pt. 226.13.
[Vol. 14:675
CLASH OF THE TITANS
The Federal Reserve Board has exercised considerable initiative in
maintaining this level of consumer protection in new markets, including
mail order and telephone order ("MOTO") transactions.4 0 Under Regula-
tion Z, before a card issuer may charge the cardholder for a transaction,
the card issuer is first required to provide a means of identifying the card-
holder, such as a signature, photo, or fingerprint on the card itself.4 In
MOTO transactions, which provide the model for Internet retail com-
merce, the card is not present for inspection by the merchant. Because one
of the conditions that the card issuer must establish to charge a cardholder
cannot be met, the card issuer may not contest a cardholder's claim that a
42
charge was not authorized. The card issuer will not be left with the loss,
however, because under the system rules of the credit card association, the
card issuer will be allowed to charge the transaction back to the merchant
who presented it.
43
The high level of protections mandated for consumers using the credit
card system, as well as the access to credit and the risk intermediation per-
formed by the system, help to explain the current dominance of credit
cards as the payment device of choice for retail Internet services. The lack
of finality created by the Regulation Z right to contest charges when the
cardholder is not satisfied with a purchase4 4 is highly favorable to con-
sumers, as is the right of a consumer to contest a charge as unauthorized.45
These rules minimize the transaction risks assumed by consumers in Inter-
net transactions by shifting the risks back onto the merchant, the mer-
chant's bank or the card issuer. The popularity of credit cards among U.S.
consumers creates liquidity for merchants accepting credit cards as a form
of online payment. 46 The credit card system provides a form of introduc-
tion between two parties who otherwise may have no way to evaluate each
other's bona fides. The sophisticated security systems that merchants have
40. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 12(b)(2)(iii)-3 (1999) (official staff inter-
pretations of Regulation Z).
41. See id. cmt. 12(b)(2)(iii)-l.
42. The same analysis applies if the merchant only reads the information recorded in
the magnetic strip on the card without examining the card itself. See id. cmt. 12(b)(2)(iii)-
2.
43. See LAWRENCE, supra note 7, at 515-516. If the presenting merchant is not
available to take the chargeback, the bank that accepted the charge from the merchant
becomes responsible for the chargeback. See id.
44. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c).
45. See id. § 226.12(b).
46. There are over 1 billion credit cards in circulation in the U.S. See 2 FURASH &
Co., supra note 26 at 83.
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developed during decades of MOTO transactions to keep fraud and error
losses to a minimum have been transferred to manage risks with Internet-
based commerce. Although credit cards have higher transaction costs
stemming from the lack of finality and come bundled with a paternalistic
risk-management system, these negatives are apparently more than offset
by a larger volume of completed transactions and the significant transac-
tion cost savings to merchants and consumers who do not have to research
each other's suitability as a counterparty.
D. Consumer funds transfers
Banks and other regulated financial institutions began to offer elec-
tronic funds transfer services to customers through automated teller ma-
chines ("ATM") in the 1970s.47 At the same time, efforts were made to
introduce the use of debit cards at point-of-sale ("POS") payment termi-
nals, although these did not capture any significant market share until the
late 1990s. 48 Following the controversy associated with the aggressive and
irresponsible marketing of credit cards and the subsequent consumer pro-
tection regulations adopted by the Federal Reserve Board to control those
abuses, both consumer protection advocates and financial service provid-
ers approached the question of consumer protections for ATM card use
with definite agendas. The resulting ,political confrontation produced the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 and Regulation E.5°
These two provisions strike a different compromise between consumer
and financial institution interests than Regulation Z. The final outcome
was a loss allocation rule that progressively placed more of the risk of loss
on the consumer when the consumer does not promptly notify the finan-
cial institution after learning that the ATM or debit card had been lost. In
marked contrast to the flat $50 limit on consumer liability under Regula-
tion Z, Regulation E contemplates that a consumer who completely fails to
notify a financial institution after losing the card may be exposed to losses
without any statutory cap.
5 1
While banks were able to negotiate a lower level of consumer protec-
tion for electronic funds transfers than for credit cards, they later found
themselves under considerable public pressure to waive the benefits of that
47. See DONALD I. BAKER AND ROLAND E. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
FuNDs TRANSFER SYSTEMS 1.03 (1996).
48. See id. at 1.03[5].
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (1994).
50. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (1996)
51. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 205.6.
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lower level of protection. In the late 1990s, banks began aggressively
marketing debit cards as an alternative to credit cards. These cards, mar-
keted with a credit card brand name, had the same convenience for the
consumer as credit cards, but very different consumer protections. Con-
sumers and consumer advocates were shocked by the magnitude of the
disparity in consumer protection provisions for debit and credit cards. One
fundamental disparity is that while fraud and error losses in credit card
transactions take place, initially, at the card issuer's expense, while these
losses in debit card transactions take place at the cardholder's expense.
The cardholder's account at a financial institution may be depleted and
remain depleted while the financial institution makes a decision whether
or not to recredit its customer's account. In 1997, Visa USA and Master-
Card International announced they would not rely on the full protections
accorded debit card issuers under Regulation E, but would voluntarily nar-
row the gap between the treatment of unauthorized or erroneous transac-
tions for debit and credit cards to bring their business practices more
closely in line with consumer expectations. They agreed to limit consumer
liability for unauthorized transactions to the same $50 that applies to credit
cards, and to shorten the time a financial institution is permitted to make
the decision whether to recredit a customer's account for an allegedly un-
authorized withdrawal.52
E. Secure Electronic Transactions ("SET")
Standardization is an essential element of any widely distributed sys-
tem for electronic commerce, and the development of technical standards
for interoperability between vendors of electronic payment services has
been no exception. Titans such as Visa and MasterCard have attempted to
seize the initiative in innovative electronic payment systems by controlling
the development of technical standards. This, in turn, would guarantee a
continued role for the Titans' proprietary payment services in the elec-
tronic commerce markets of the future. The vast financial resources that
the Titans can command have been poured into the development and mar-
keting of the Secure Electronic Transactions ("SET") standard, which, if
widely adopted, would permit the use of advanced encryption technology
in credit card transactions and would help preserve the dominance of
credit cards among electronic payment services.
The promise of asymmetric cryptography, in the form of digital sig-
natures, to resolve some of the new security issues raised by conducting
52. See Jeffrey Green, When Voluntary Action May Not Be Enough, CREDIT CARD
MANAGEMENT, May 1998.
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business over open, public computer networks was widely recognized in
the technology community a decade ago. 53 Without standards to facilitate
the adoption of cryptography, however, there was no way for application
developers to realize its promise. Visa and MasterCard initially began
work on separate standards for the use of public key cryptography in con-
nection with electronic funds transfers, but in 1996 decided to join forces
in developing a single standard for secure electronic transactions, or
SET.54 In 1997, SET was widely expected to make the Internet safe for
electronic commerce by resolving some of the uncertainty that prospective
transactors felt about the security of Internet transmissions. SET would
require each cardholder, financial intermediary and merchant to use a
digital signature certificate in Internet transactions. Consumers would send
their signed orders to Internet merchants together with encrypted credit
card information that would be passed on, unread, to the financial inter-
mediary. The intermediary would process the credit card authorization and
notify the merchant, who would then complete the transaction with the
consumer.
The SET system ran into problems almost from the outset, and by
early 1999 was no longer in the forefront of discussions about Internet
commerce security.55 While SET may be a very sophisticated system for
improving the security of electronic funds transfers over open networks
such as the Internet, it is also a complex and cumbersome one. The speci-
fications for SET were initially driven by technological concerns associ-
ated with establishing what would have been the first large-scale public
key infrastructure using existing financial networks and the Internet. As a
result, the operation of SET procedures seemed likely to be too demanding
of existing computers and networks. These problems might occur at the
level of the individual consumer's home PC or at the level of the mer-
chants and financial intermediaries who were trying to prepare for large
volumes of message flow accompanied by large numbers of complex
53. For a general discussion of the role of cryptography in electronic commerce
conducted over open networks, see Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets
and the Regulation of Internet Commerce, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1177 (1998).
54. See SET Secure Electronic Transaction LLC, About SETCo Secure Electronic
Transaction, LLC (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.setco.org/about.html>. For general
information about SET, see SET Secure Electronic Transaction LLC, SETCo Website
(visited Apr. 21, 1999) <http://www.setco.org>.
55. The SETCo website FAQ for merchants and users states that "SETCo expects
that many banks will begin offering digital certificates to merchants and cardholders in
mid-1998." SET Secure Electronic Transaction LLC, Frequently Asked Questions (vis-
ited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.setco.org/faq-usr.html>. In fact, this did not happen.
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computations required for cryptographic functions. 56 When merchants ap-
peared reluctant to invest in the reengineering required to support such
demands on their computer resources and networks, SET was marketed as
a solution to the problem of consumer fraud through false claims of unau-
thorized use of a card as well as to the problem of merchant fraud. SET
marketing materials never explained how the use of a digital signature
certificate would be analyzed in light of Federal Reserve Board opinions
interpreting Regulation Z, however.57 Notwithstanding the outpouring of
support for SET, by early 1999 it had still failed to garner any significant
share of the U.S. market and achieved only a few isolated implementations
outside the U.S.
58
IV. PAST FAILURES: THE FIRST OLYMPIAN ASSAULT
When the Internet was still something of a blank slate upon which one
could project all manner of utopian or dystopian notions at will, it seemed
obvious that major innovations in payment system technology would be
needed to support Internet commerce. None of the early pioneers in this
field have yet enjoyed the market success that their radical and innovative
approaches would seem to have indicated a few years ago, and quite a few
have ceased operations altogether.
A. Early fatalities: First Virtual and DigiCash
In 1994, First Virtual was established to offer secure payments tech-
nology to support Internet commerce. In 1996, First Virtual enjoyed a suc-
cessful initial public offering, positioning itself as an Internet payments
company.59 Individual subscribers authorized First Virtual to charge their
credit cards for an initial allocation of funds to spend. Then subscribers
could visit the websites of merchants who have signed up with First Vir-
tual and authorize the merchants to debit their balances by using a PIN
56. SETCo has posted a white paper on its website challenging these claims. See
CHRIS LETOQ & STEVE YOUNG, SET COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 25-26
(Nov. 2, 1998) (White Paper prepared by Gartner Consulting for SETCo), available at
<http://www.setco.org/download/setco6.pdf> (PDF file).
57. The SETCo website FAQ for merchants and users stated "Some of the initial
key benefits [to merchants] are ... [rleduced costs associated with fraud." SET Secure
Electronic Transaction LLC, supra note 55.
58. What may have been the most significant factor undermining SET's prospects
for acceptance in the marketplace was the development of the SSL standard for secure
message transmission. See discussion infra, Part V.A.
59. See Elizabeth Douglass, IPO Nets a Bundle for First Virtual, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., December 14, 1996 at C-1
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number. The success of alternatives such as SSL eroded demand for the
First Virtual service, which never achieved a critical mass of individual or
merchant subscribers. In 1998, First Virtual announced the cessation of its
payment services and the refocusing of the company on electronic mes-
saging services only. 60
In the 1980s, David Chaum obtained patents for blind signature cryp-
tographic protocols that might support the development of much more
novel and significant alternative payment systems. These protocols per-
mit the creation of electronic tokens that can circulate as money in an on-
line environment without revealing the identity of purchasers using the
tokens. 62 Chaum founded DigiCash in an effort to exploit the commercial
potential of this technology as a form of online electronic money, and li-
censed the system to Mark Twain Bank in the U.S. and to various banks in
other countries. 63 Individuals wishing to use e-cash to make Internet pur-
chases could draw on their account balances at the licensee bank to
download e-coins for safekeeping in a "wallet" on the hard drive of their
personal computer. When the individual wished to make a purchase, the
software would deduct e-cash from the wallet and transfer it to the mer-
chant. 64 Although Chaum's system is not premised on the use of a con-
ventional system for clearing and settlement to support it, the Mark Twain
application allowed the merchant to transfer the e-cash back to the bank to
confirm that it had not been double spent. The bank would cancel the e-
65coins and credit the merchant's account with the bank. In November
1998, DigiCash announced that it was seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy re-
lief in order to reorganize its business activities. Mercantile Bank, Mark
Twain Bank's successor organization, had earlier discontinued the service,
although some overseas banks were still marketing e-coins.
66
The promise of the e-coin technology may ultimately be realized in
U.S. financial markets, but, consumers are not sufficiently motivated by
60. See Bob Woods, First Virtual Gives Net Payment System Heave Ho,
NEWSBYTES, July 21, 1998
61. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 115 (2d ed. 1996).
62. See DigiCash, How eCash Works Inside (visited Apr. 26, 1999)
<http://www.digicash.com/index_e.htm>. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Flood
Control on the Information Ocean: Living With Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed
Databases, 15 J.L. & CoM. 395, 460 (1996).
63. See James Gleick, Dead as a Dollar, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 16, 1996, at 26.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Jeffrey Kutler and Carol Power, Electronic Commerce: Bankrupt DigiCash
to Seek Financing, New Allies, AM. BANKER, November 10, 1998, at 18.
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privacy concerns to create the demand that DigiCash's early promoters
expected. As with First Virtual, the total number of subscribers to the e-
coin system never achieved a critical mass. Purchasers did not enjoy any
float, and instead tied up resources in e-coin balances that did not earn in-
terest and were at significant risk of loss should the security of the wallet
on the hard drive be compromised. Merchants also faced a risk of loss due
to the threat of double spending, although the clearing system provided by
the bank was designed to keep such losses to a minimum. An e-coin sys-
tem would only be competitive with established payment devices if con-
sumers were willing to accept higher transaction risks and greater finality.
Apparently, they were not.
B. Walking Wounded: MilliCent, CyberCoin, Mondex
Various other players in the market for innovative electronic payment
services have not ceased operations, although the demand for their prod-
ucts remains unclear. These include "micropayment" technologies such as
MilliCent and CyberCoin, and smart card payment devices such as Mon-
dex. Micropayment technologies looked destined for greatness a few years
ago based on a common forecast regarding the future of Internet com-
merce. Because many businesses were reluctant to distribute content free
of charge over the Internet and because subscription services are uneco-
nomical for many types of content, it seemed likely that some vendors and
purchasers would be interested in small, one-shot transactions at prices
below those that current electronic payment systems can easily support.
Micropayment technologies, which would permit consumers to download
electronic money to a personal computer that could then be spent in small
increments with participating merchants, seemed almost certain to catch
on. 67 Millicent 68 and CyberCoin69 were two products developed to exploit
this market that have languished in a vacuum of consumer demand. While
there may be a market one day for Internet micropayments, it is unclear
when that day will arrive.70
67. See Kimberly Patch and Eric Smalley, Drop a Dime Online, INFOWORLD, Nov.
30, 1998, at 71.
68. See MilliCent Microcommerce System, Find Out What's New, What's Hot and
What's Happening With MilliCent (visited April 21, 1999)
<http://www.millicent.digital.com>.
69. See CyberCash, Inc., The CyberCoin Cash Card User's Guide (visited April 26,
1999) <http://www.cybercash.com/mscpc/help/cashcardtoc.html>.
70. Developers of micropayment technology remain hopeful that it will one day
prove to be a "disruptive technology" that challenges successful, established competitors
by meeting consumers' unstated or future needs. See CLAYTON CHRISTIANSEN, THE
1999]
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Mondex smart card technology is another promising technology whose
moment of greatness always seems to be at hand yet never quite arrives.
The Mondex card is a stored-value card that can take the place of cash by
permitting transfers of value onto and off of the card. 7 1 Unlike the Digi-
Cash system as implemented by the Mark Twain Bank, there is no re-
quirement that transactions onto and off of a Mondex smart card be
cleared through a central system. This feature reduces the transaction costs
of the system while also increasing some of the risks such as forgery or
money laundering. Because a smart card does not merely store data but
can also perform processing functions, the electronic cash function of
Mondex can be combined with other functions to enhance its appeal to
consumers and merchants, such as tracking loyalty program credits.
As powerful as the Mondex technology is, this kind of smart card-
based electronic payment technology has not achieved any noteworthy
successes in the U.S. to date.72 Millions of dollars of smart cards were
distributed without charge during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, but
utilization rates were very low. In 1998, a smart card pilot on the Upper
West Side of Manhattan proved to be a disappointment for the financial
institutions sponsoring it. U.S. consumers of electronic financial services
are apparently too satisfied with existing alternatives such as checks,
credit cards and debit cards to adopt this new technology in large numbers,
although smart cards are rapidly gaining popularity in other countries.
Compared with smart cards, credit and debit cards offer consumers con-
73siderable benefits under existing federal regulations.
INNOVATOR's DILEMMA (1997) (discussion of "disruptive technologies"). The sudden
popularity of MP3 media files has focused the minds of intellectual property rights own-
ers on the need for finely calibrated metering and payment technologies in Internet com-
merce. See Whit Andrews, Microsoft Bets $15M on Maker of Micropayment Technol-
ogy, INTERNET WORLD, March 15, 1999.
71. See Mondex Electronic Cash, What is Mondex? (visited April 26, 1999)
<http://www.mondex.com/mondex/cgi-bin/printpage.pl?style=noframescash&fname=../
documents/intro 1 .txt&doctype=genp>.
72. Smart cards are a popular payment device in Europe, where the technology was
developed and in Japan. Checks and credit cards are less popular in Europe and Japan
than in the U.S. while payment in cash or devices with the same finality as cash such as
debit cards are popular, leading to lower consumer expectations with regard to the finality
of payments and their ability to enjoy the float.
73. See discussion of credit and debit card liability rules, supra Parts HI.C-D.
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V. THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: THE NEXT GENERATION
OF ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS
The history of commercial exploitation of the Internet is short.74 In
light of the successes of radically new concepts such as the browser and
the hypertext interface, it once seemed plausible that wholly new payment
systems might also catch on like wildfire, completely displacing demand
for existing services. As shown, however, existing payment systems are
meeting the demand for new electronic payment services with only minor
modifications. Novel services are finding it difficult to fulfill the condi-
tions required to make a modem payment system function in any envi-
ronment.
With major obstacles impeding the Olympians' ability to launch alter-
native payment systems, successful Olympian strategies may consist of
finding ways to harmonize Titan and Olympian approaches to electronic
commerce. One possible strategy for getting new payment technologies
into the hands of large numbers of users is to create hybrid solutions that
combine the best elements of both old and new payment systems tech-
nologies.75 In fact, a few examples of hybrid services currently exist, some
owned by the Olympians, some by the Titans.
A. Secure Sockets Layer ("SSL")
The Secure Sockets Layer ("SSL") standard, developed by the Olym-
pian Netscape as a simple, stop-gap solution pending the development of
more sophisticated standards such as SET,76 has achieved widespread ac-
ceptance as the standard for communicating credit card information over
the Internet. 77 It represents an unusual situation where Olympian technol-
74. Before 1995, the NSF Acceptable Use Policy prohibited commercial use of the
Internet. See NAT'L SCI. FouND., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN'L, REvIEW OF NSFNET 79-80
(1993), available at <http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/stis1993/oig9301/oig9301.txt> (paginated
ASCII document).
75. For example, smart cards might be used as access devices for existing account-
based systems such as checking accounts or credit cards. The extra processing functions
of the smart card could be used first to enhance the security of older systems in ways that
are transparent to end users. Once smart cards are in the hands of end users and large
numbers of merchants have installed smart card readers, additional application for this
technology could be added, such as tracking merchant loyalty programs or disbursing
electronic cash equivalents. See Jeffrey Kutler, Smart Cards: Mondex Again Trumpets
The Need For Open Internet Payment Standards, AM. BANKER, April 14, 1999, at 13.
76. See discussion supra Part III.E.
77. Although SSL began as a proprietary standard, Netscape is taking steps to have
SSL recognized as a World Wide Web Consortium and an Internet Engineering Task
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ogy has enhanced the position of Titan payment systems in Internet com-
merce. SSL lacks the elegance and coherence of SET, but it has come to
dominate the market for retail electronic commerce by meeting the mini-
mum requirements of the relevant stakeholders.
78
The SSL standard does not use digital signatures to bind human iden-
tities to online communications. 79 Instead, it relies on the use of a digital
certificate to identify a computer, the e-commerce server. The consumer's
browser validates the server's certificate, and then uses the public key in
the certificate to share a symmetric key with the server. For the remainder
of the session, the shared symmetric key is used to encrypt communica-
tions between the browser and the server, preventing credit card or other
sensitive information from being sent over the Internet in the clear.
8 0
The SSL protocol permits payment information to be sent over the
Internet, replacing a mail or telephone link between the purchaser and the
vendor in the MOTO model, but maintaining an equivalent level of secu-
rity.8 1 The SSL standard has proven highly successful because it does not
place excessive demands on the average consumer's home PC and has re-
moved what was one of the most pressing concerns associated with Inter-
net commerce: the public nature of its communications infrastructure.
8 2
The SSL standard does not address the security of credit card information
once it is on the merchant's e-commerce server, nor does it provide any
information about which human being entered the credit card information
transmitted to the vendor.
83
Purchasers have been happy with the level of protection provided by
SSL because the normal consumer-friendly credit card system rules apply.
The risk that the merchant may misuse consumer credit card information
is not borne by the consumer but by the merchant's bank.84 Vendors have
Force standard, which would effectively convert it into an open, public standard. See
whatis, What Is ... SSL? (last modified January 4, 1999) <http://whatis.com/ssl.htm>.
78. See Cynthia Morgan, Dead Set against SET?, COMPUTERWORLD, March 29,
1999 at 74.
79. See id. The SSL 3.0 specification does, in fact, permit client certificates to be
used, although there are no major retail applications using this feature of SSL today. See
Netscape Communications Corp., SSL 3.0 Specification (visited Apr. 26, 1999)
<http://home.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/index.htmil>.
80. See Netscape Communications Corp., supra note 79.
81. See Neal Weinberg, Digital Dough Fails to Rise, NETWORK WORLD, April 12,
1999 at 47.
82. See id.
83. See Netscape Communications Corp., supra note 79.
84. See discussion supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
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been happy with the level of protection provided by SSL because the risks
of accepting credit card charges over the Internet can be brought in line
with the risks of accepting MOTO credit card charges. 85 A merchant can
decide whether to do business over the Internet by estimating both the
likely return on Internet business (in light of these higher charges) and the
likely total volume of chargebacks.
A cloud on the horizon indicates that SSL may not be a lasting solu-
tion for securing Internet credit card transactions. 86 The volume of dis-
putes associated with Internet purchases seem to be disproportionately
large-while Internet transactions account for only 2% of card transac-
tions, by some industry estimates they account for 50% of disputes. 87 Un-
less the Federal Reserve Board changes its interpretation of Regulation Z
regarding the inability of card issuers and merchants to contest a card-
holder's claim that a charge is unauthorized in any transaction in which
the card was not available for inspection by the merchant, 88 merchants will
have no choice but to press for improved authentication technology or re-
visions to Regulation Z.
B. E-Check
The established players have not completely ignored the possibility of
using new technologies to gain or maintain market share. The benefits of
this approach are that new technologies are harmonized with established
business practices. This approach was used with the electronic check, or
"e-check", developed by a consortium of major banks. 89
In 1998, various banks entered into a pilot with the Department of De-
fense to test this new service and it will be some time before the viability
85. Weinberg, supra note 81. For instance, merchant banks and credit card associa-
tions have adjusted their pricing structure for accepting credit card charges, with the low-
est discount rates applying to material-world transactions where the card is present and
can be inspected by the merchant, higher discount rates for MOTO transactions, and the
highest discount rates for Internet originated charges. Telephone Interview with Steve
Watson, Executive Sales Officer, BA Merchant Services, Dallas, Texas (Apr. 21, 1999).
86. See Rod Newing, Consumers' Trust Is Growing, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), March
24, 1999, at 7.
87. E-mail from Lynn Wheeler, technologist with First Data Merchant Services
Corp., to author (Mar. 26, 1999) (quoting credit card industry sources) (on file with
author). This information should be evaluated in light of the investment Visa and
MasterCard have made in SET and has not been independently verified.
88. See, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 12(b)(2)(iii)-3 (1999) (official staff inter-
pretations of Regulation Z).
89. For information about the e-check project see Financial Services Technology
Consortium, echeck, (visited April 20, 1999) <http://www.echeck.org/>.
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of this concept for a larger market is determined. 90 The e-check is an elec-
tronic equivalent of a paper check, created through the use of new techni-
cal standards and encryption technologies. The e-check standard was care-
fully developed to mimic the functions of check in an effort to ease bur-
dens to bank customers of switching from paper checks to wholly elec-
tronic payment systems. 91 It will remain unclear for some time whether
enough financial institutions and businesses that currently transfer funds
by check will be willing to invest in the technology required to make the
e-check as universally acceptable as the paper check or use e-checks in a




CyberCash has developed a new service, InstaBuy, which is rapidly
gaining popularity on retail Internet sites. 93 The InstaBuy service permits
consumers to enter their credit card information into a secure site main-
tained by CyberCash and then to authorize the InstaBuy service to release
the information to Internet merchants who have also signed up for the
service. 94 InstaBuy eliminates the need for consumers to download wallet
software, which is required for the CyberCoin service, or to enter their
credit card information each time they wish to make a purchase, which is
necessary for most Internet retail sites today. Consumers are not charged
for the service, can access their credit card information maintained by In-
staBuy from any computer with access to the Internet, and can only use
InstaBuy with merchants that have been enrolled in the program. This
service is less ambitious than the earlier CyberCoin service as it only of-
fers consumers a simpler and more convenient way to make credit card
purchases over the Internet using SSL for a secure connection to the mer-
90. See Financial Services Technology Consortium, Financial Services Technology
Consortium and U.S. Treasury Teaming up on Electronic Check Pilot Program, (visited
Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.echeck.org/kitprint/index.html>.
91. See Financial Services Technology Consortium, Description of the Electronic
Check (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.echeck.org/kitprint/index.html>.
92. The lack of momentum behind the e-check project may not be due to insuffi-
cient demand. The banking industry is currently concentrating most of its effort on sur-
viving the Year 2000 problem. Once banking executives and technologists can return
their attention to other issues, interest in e-check may increase dramatically.
93. See First USA Corp., First USA, Premier E-Retailers Team to Enhance Online
Shopping Experience; Internet Merchants Facilitate E-Commerce with VersaPay Digital
Wallet (visited Apr. 24, 1999) <http://www.instabuy.com/press/99marlfusa_versa.html>.
94. See CyberCash Corp., Instabuy-How It Works (visited Apr. 24, 1999)
<http://www.instabuy.com/check-it-out.html>.
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chant's site. Like any other endeavor, however, InstaBuy's ultimate suc-
cess will depend on whether enough consumers and merchants can be
signed up for the service to justify the cost of the service to merchants.
D. Portals
In 1998, portals attracted a great deal of attention as a way to permit
end users to find Internet resources more easily, and to increase traffic to
Internet commerce sites.95 Online financial services have been a common
feature of portals.
One electronic payment system likely to be promoted through portals
is Internet bill presentment and payment services. With such a service, a
consumer could access all his or her monthly bills, review the contents of
the bill and authorize payment of the bills using a variety of payment de-
vices. It is unclear at this time whether the market for Internet bill pre-
sentment and payment will be a service offered primarily by banks offer-
ing Internet services, or technology firms such as CheckFree. 96 Such firms
provide a unified interface to the consumer, but use a variety of payment
devices to execute the consumer's payment orders. The terms under which
the partnering of Internet access providers, technology firms and regulated
financial institutions will take place are still in flux, so it is unclear how
many services will be provided by entities outside the scope of current
regulations. The magnitude of changes needed in existing regulations will
only become clear when the market for Internet bill presentment and pay-
ment is better defined.
E. NACHA
In 1998, in an effort to maintain the relevance of the automated clear-
ing house ("ACH") payment system in a world of Internet-based com-
merce, the Internet Council of the National Automated Clearing House
95. A portal is "a Web site that offers a broad array of resources and services such
as e-mail, discussion forums, search engines, and on-line shopping malls." Vincent James
& Erin Jansen, NetLingo: The Internet Language Dictionary (visited Apr. 22, 1999)
<http://www.netlingo.com/lookup.cfm?term=portal>. In this sense, a portal is an en-
hanced version of an earlier generation of Internet search engine or index sites. An end
user might be permitted to designate which Internet resources the user would like to be
offered access to from a customized portal site, for example permitting an end user to
access a home banking site, an online brokerage site, a news site, an online auction site
and various Internet retail sites. Portals should reduce the amount of time the end user is
required to spend locating and accessing resources, and distributors of goods and services
over the Internet to build relationships with their customers.
96. See CheckFree Corporation, CheckFree Experience Online, (visited Apr. 22,
1999) <http://www.checkfree.com>.
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Association ("NACHA") conducted a pilot to determine the compatibility
of the ACH system with a browser-based interface for retail Internet
commerce. 97 One of the workhorses of electronic payment services in the
U.S., the ACH network performs functions such as direct deposit of pay-
roll and automatic funds transfers for routine expenses such as installment
loans or utilities. To date, though, it has not played a major role in the de-
velopment of Internet-based commerce. The pilot program involved a va-
riety of banks, technology vendors, and members of the NACHA Internet
Council in simulated transactions. The pilot demonstrated that while it
might be possible to use digital signatures and a browser interface to initi-
ate funds transfers through the ACH system to support retail commerce,
further study was needed before such a service could be offered to the
public. 9
8
F. What the future holds
The market for electronic payment services remains crowded with
competing vendors and putative standard-setters, none of which have yet
gained a commanding lead over the pack of aspirants. Titans may ensure
their continued success in electronic payment services markets if they can
persuade Olympians to join them in collaborative relationships. It is possi-
ble that Olympians will survive and prosper by licensing their innovative
technologies to Titans who have the capital and established relationships
with consumers needed to achieve critical market share for new technolo-
gies. Such collaborations will permit regulators to maintain current levels
of safety and reliability for new products by reviewing the new technolo-
gies and their proposed uses in light of existing regulatory standards.
One opening for collaboration between vendors of new technologies
and established providers may come if the existing electronic payment
system security infrastructure is upgraded or replaced. Electronic funds
transfer systems such as those used for retail ATM machines rely on the
Data Encryption Standard ("DES") established in the 1970s. 99 Groups that
oppose the current U.S. policy of limiting the use of encryption in the pri-
vate sector to older standards such as DES have focused on breaking DES
97. See The Internet Council, The Internet Council Home Page (visited Apr. 21,
1999) <http://internetcouncil.nacha.org>.
98. See The Internet Council, Authentication & Network of Trust Work Group
(ANT) Work Group Description, (visited Apr. 27, 1999)
<http://internetcouncil.nacha.org/wgdesc.htm>.
99. DES was developed by IBM as the Lucifer algorithm in the early 1970s, and
was adopted as a federal standard in 1976, and as a private sector standard for financial
institutions in 1981. See SCHNEIER, supra note 60, at 266-7.
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as a way of demonstrating the inadequacy of current U.S. government
policies regarding encryption. 100 Financial institutions are in the process of
replacing DES-based technology with higher levels of security such as
double-DES, triple-DES and other encryption standards. At the same time
that encryption standards are being reevaluated, it is possible that other
elements of the existing payment system infrastructure may also be up-
graded. Such replacements may be beneficial-for example, replacing
magnetic stripe cards with smart cards would permit the use of more ad-
vanced authentication technology in electronic payment systems.
Looking further ahead, services such as financial electronic data inter-
change and electronic bill presentment may finally permit electronic funds
transfers to replace checks for routine business payments. This has yet to
occur in large part due to the inability to include transaction information
with payment information in transactions among all institutions that accept
electronic funds transfers. In order for businesses to have the option to in-
clude transaction information with any funds transfer, many businesses
and financial institutions will have to upgrade their existing funds transfer
processes, which they have been unwilling to do. The federal government
is setting a faster tempo for changes with its EFT99 initiative.101 This ini-
tiative will force many recipients of payments from the federal govern-
ment and financial institutions to be able to accept funds transfers with
transaction information in the very near future.' 
02
New entrants in the market for electronic payment services may enjoy
greater success outside mature markets such as the U.S. than inside them.
In Europe, for instance, consumers are less accustomed to using payment
devices that include an element of float for consumers. 10 3 As a result, ac-
100. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, RSA Code-Breaking Contest Again Won by
Distributed.Net and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) (Jan. 19, 1999)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Cryptonisc/DESCracker/HTMU
19990119_deschallenge3.html>. For a general discussion of U.S. encryption policy and
its critics, see STEWART A. BAKER AND PAUL R. HURST, THE LIMITS OF TRUST (1998).
101. EFT99 is an initiative of the U.S. Department of the Treasury designed to all
Federal payments, except tax refunds, from paper-based payment systems to electronic
funds transfers by January 2, 1999. See Financial Management Service, Electronic Funds
Transfer Home Page (last updated April 14, 1999) <http://www.fms.treas.gov/eft/
index.html>.
102. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFF. OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, TREASURY
FINALIzES ELEcTRONIc PAYMENT RULE As ENROLLMENT NUMBERS CONTINUE To RISE
(September 25, 1998) available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/pr2710.htm>.
103. U.S. consumers are very familiar with such devices. See supra Part III.A (check
clearing); Part II.C (credit cards).
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ceptance of smart cards as a payment device has been much greater. The
dismal failure to date in the U.S. market of smart cards as a payment de-
vice demonstrates that U.S. consumers are showing a greater degree of
sophistication with regard to product features and a greater resistance to
change than most Olympians expected, especially in light of the success of
innovative new offerings in other areas of Internet electronic commerce. 104
The greatest successes for such new payment devices may ultimately
come in markets in developing countries such as China, where there are
virtually no alternative electronic payment technologies. 10 5 In such mar-
kets, there may be no business case for rolling out older models of elec-
tronic payment systems where the basic infrastructure is still lacking, and
consumers may accept the most up-to-date technology available quite
happily.
Emerging payment technologies that gain substantial market share in
Europe, Japan or developing countries may be able to leverage that market
share to reenter the U.S. market on more favorable terms in the future. As
U.S. financial services markets become more integrated into global mar-
kets, it is unlikely that the flow of standards and products will always be
from the U.S. outward. In the near term, however, established services
such as credit cards, debit cards and ATM machines that were perfected in
the U.S. and other developed countries, may continue to crowd out more
technologically-sophisticated alternatives.
VI. INTERESTS OF STAKEHOLDERS AND GATEKEEPERS IN
ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS
These larger trends in the market for electronic payment services and
in the development of technology will be shaped by the degree to which
the various stakeholders-the consumers, merchants, Titans and Olympi-
ans--can protect their interests. In many respects these interests are in-
compatible. The regulators-the gatekeepers to the market-have the
104. The phenomenal successes of many new Internet electronic commerce ventures
raise difficult questions for investors and financiers struggling to determine whether these
new models really make any sense or are just a reflection of a bubble economy. See, e.g.,
George Anders, Nothing ventured ... "You expect big losses and want $10 million? Sure,
we'll consider it, " WALL ST. J., March 17, 1999, at Al (discussing the ability of Intemet
entrepreneurs to obtain millions of dollars of funding for businesses that are unprofitable
today and have no prospect of profitability in the near future).
105. See Patricia Lamiell, China to establish smart card project, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, August 22, 1998, at D5.
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ability to moderate the outcomes that competitive forces alone would pro-
duce.
A. Stakeholder Interests
By looking at the costs and benefits imposed on customers by various
major payment devices, it is easy to understand why customers of regu-
lated financial institutions still prefer checks to electronic equivalents. The
benefits customers enjoy as a result of choosing checks are directly offset
by the burdens they impose on merchants. Yet until payment service pro-
viders and merchants find a way to meet not just their own needs but also
the genuine needs of their customers with electronic payment devices,
customers will continue to resist wholesale migration to new forms of
payment. While a great deal of consumer resistance may be due to poorly
designed interfaces or flawed business models for new payment devices, it
may also be due in part to a bias on the part of consumers in favor of pay-
ment systems with known, manageable risks. Consumers have demon-
strated repeatedly that no matter how favorable a new electronic payment
system is for merchants and service providers, they will refrain from using
the new system unless they perceive it to be as beneficial to them as ex-
isting systems.
Internet merchants are enjoying considerable success today with minor
modifications to established systems, but if disputes associated with online
credit card transactions continue to grow, merchants may become more
willing to pay for more sophisticated solutions such as SET. As businesses
develop more integrated, comprehensive information technology systems,
they will be looking for payment services that can be integrated seam-
lessly into those systems. In order for Internet merchants to be able to pro-
cess payment information automatically, a great deal of standardization
will need to take place in the way data describing the transaction is at-
tached to the payment information. In addition, businesses would like the
payment transaction information to be available for other uses, such as dif-
ferentiating between valued and undesirable customers, building closer
relationships with more profitable customers, and exploiting the commer-
cial value in transaction data via other processes that cannot now be per-
formed by the merchant.1
06
106. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the privacy issues raised by these
data practices. Many of these uses are not currently regulated under US law today, al-
though it is possible that some businesses will try to compete by offering to exceed legal
minimums in their data privacy policies.
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Regulated electronic payment service providers need to find new ways
to leverage their existing investment in legacy systems, while keeping up
with the rapid pace of innovation characteristic of Internet electronic
commerce in general. Banks are at risk of finding their market limited to
only the most commodified, low profit financial services, while customers
build relationships with newer service providers who are able to capture
the more differentiated and profitable front end of the payment system in-
terface. Existing electronic payment systems such as the automated clear-
ing house system for electronic funds transfers have complex, cumber-
some interfaces but operate with a high degree of reliability and secu-
rity.107 If Yahoo!, Microsoft or Amazon.com can design and retain control
of a user interface that integrates automated clearing house payment func-
tions with a customized point of entry to a complete range of Internet
services, regulated financial intermediaries will not be able to reap any
significant profits from the limited range of services they continue to pro-
vide. Banks want to avoid seeing their contribution to the next generation
of electronic payment systems reduced to some minimal clearing and set-
tlement service. Collaborating with new technology services may be an
easy way for traditional payment service providers to give their systems a
fast facelift, but such collaborations also carry the risk that the traditional
service may lose its current close connection to the consumer customer or
retail merchant.
Technology firms seeking to participate in the construction of new
payment systems infrastructure will benefit most if they are able to gain
market dominance with proprietary standards, and if they are able to es-
tablish a right to payment based on transaction volume or value. If tech-
nology firms design systems around open, public standards, they will face
a much more competitive market for their services. Just as collaboration
between traditional payment service providers and technology firms is
perilous for the traditional providers, it is perilous for the technology firm
if its partners can eventually master the new technology and internally
generate the necessary infrastructure instead of outsourcing is production.
B. Gatekeeper Interests
Although wildcat banking was once a legitimate occupation in the
U.S., 10 8 regulation of financial services at both the state and federal level
107. See, e.g., 2 FURASH & Co., supra note 26, at 29-37.
108. When President Andrew Jackson vetoed the rechartering of the Second
National Bank in 1832, the individual states became solely responsible
for controlling the banking industry in America. During the next thirty
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is now inescapable. The will to maintain a comprehensive framework of
regulation over financial markets was strengthened in the wake of the
banking crisis of the 1930s, and the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.
The regulatory legacy of these crises is one of highly intrusive oversight
and major restrictions on the scope of operations.
The common wisdom now generally equates such heavy handed
regulation with obstacles to effective competition, and makes the regula-
tory calculus for government agencies considering intervention in emerg-
ing markets complex and ambiguous. At least in the case of credit cards
and Regulation Z protections for consumers, however, the heavy hand of
regulation may have given established payment systems the competitive
edge they needed to achieve rapid dominance of the market for retail
Internet payment services. If generations of intrusive government regula-
tion have dulled the wits of consumers to the point they cannot distinguish
between acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk associated with new
electronic payment services, then regulators will face a difficult task in
protecting consumers while not stifling competition. If years of intrusive
government regulation have instead produced a generation of consumers
who have a reasonably good understanding of the costs and benefits asso-
ciated with existing electronic payment systems and have a marked prefer-
ence for those regulated systems which treat consumers well, then market
demand may push providers of electronic financial services into the arms
of regulators. Before the Titans can profit from the latter scenario, how-
ever, many of their existing payment services will need something of a
facelift to meet the technological demands of emerging electronic com-
merce markets.
The new payment service providers may enjoy a distinct competitive
advantage over regulated financial intermediaries if they are able to com-
pete head-on without being subject to the regulatory burdens themselves.
If the Olympian developers are able to establish significant market share
in emerging electronic payment technologies before regulators decide to
subject them to traditional financial market regulations, they will enjoy a
significant competitive advantage over their regulated Titan competitors.
If regulators want to avoid encouraging unregulated competitors from
years, commonly referred to as the era of 'free banking,' state-created
currency removed the public's confidence in banks and resulted in the
most chaotic era in our nation's financial history."
Stephen G. Stroup, Comment, Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.: Charging To-
ward Deregulation of the Credit Card Industry, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 601, 603 (1997)
(footnotes omitted).
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taking market share from regulated financial intermediaries, they will need
to maintain their current agnostic position with regard to regulating inno-
vative offerings by established electronic payment service providers.
Should regulated financial intermediaries choose not to collaborate
with technology innovators, but try to compete directly with them for con-
sumer markets, the regulated intermediaries are sure to lobby regulators to
release them from some of their current legal and regulatory obligations. If
regulators hold financial institutions to high standards that impose sub-
stantial costs and limit their ability to keep up with more nimble competi-
tors but fail to maintain an equivalent level of control over those new
competitors, regulated financial institutions would experience a loss of
market share without any offsetting increase in the effective level of con-
sumer protection. 109
In an era of deregulation, regulators may face considerable obstacles to
expanding existing regulatory regimes to cover new payments technolo-
gies. In 1996, the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") issued proposed
amendments to Regulation E to deal with new developments such as
stored value cards. 110 Congress responded by prohibiting the FRB from
taking action to finalize any amendments to Regulation E until the FRB
had determined whether Regulation E could be applied to stored value
cards "without adversely affecting the cost, development and operation of
such products." 111 The FRB, duly chastised, delivered its report to Con-
gress on April 2, 1997, finding that policy statements or education pro-
grams might be less costly and just as effective as regulations in protecting
consumers interests.] 12
Until the technology innovators can mount a more credible threat to
the ruling hegemony of highly-regulated electronic payment services, the
wait-and-see and incremental-reform approaches currently being taken by
regulators are adequate, because the magnitude of the threat posed by
emerging services is negligible. If this trend continues in the future, then
109. See, e.g., letter from John J. Byrne, American Bankers Association, to FDIC,
FRB, OCC and OTS (Mar. 8, 1999), available at <http://www.aba.com/aba/static/
KYCcmtltr.html>.
110. See Electronic Funds Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996).
111. Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-469 (1996), § 2601(a)(1).
112. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER ACT TO
ELECTRONIC STORED-VALUE PRODUCTS (1996), available at
<http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/RptCongress/eftarpt.pdf>.
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regulators in this field may be spared the task of finding new techniques
for domesticating rapid technological innovation without stifling competi-
tion. Competitive offerings from regulated providers of electronic pay-
ment services may permit consumers to continue to rely on payment serv-
ices that manage a number of the risks of electronic commerce fairly and
efficiently as well as advancing the technology of market infrastructures.
Instead of resorting to regulation, the problem of competing proprie-
tary solutions for meeting the future needs of consumers in Internet com-
merce might be resolved through the work of standards-setting organiza-
tions. 113 For example, the current network of retail electronic funds trans-
fers conducted through ATMs and point-of-sale terminals using debit
cards operates today due to the standardization work of the American Na-
tional Standards Institute ("ANSI") Accredited Standards Conmittee
("ASC") X9." 4 The work of open standards-setting organizations might
be helpful in resolving some of the current uncertainty regarding the future
direction of electronic payments technologies. However, formal standards-
setting organizations such as ANSI ASC X9 are competing with a wide
range of private and more informal standards-setting organizations that
hope to influence the future of electronic payments technologies. For ex-
ample, the Financial Services Technology Consortium 115 and the Banker's
Roundtable Banking Industry Technology Secretariat 116 are financial
services industry trade associations that cater to large banks and financial
services companies that have tried to establish themselves as industry
leaders through projects such as e-check' 17 and the Bank Internet Payment
System.1 8 In 1999, however, not many proposed standards were making
headway in the market, either because they had not yet moved beyond the
pilot stage or because, like SET, they were not being adopted following
113. For a general discussion of standards-developing organizations, see CARL F.
CARGILL, OPEN SYSTEMS STANDARDIZATION: A BUSINESS APPROACH (1997)
114. For information about the work of the ANSI ASC X9, see Accredited Standards
Comm. X9 & American Bankers Ass'n., X9 Overview (visited Apr. 26, 1999)
<http://www.x9.org>.
115. Membership in FSTC requires payment of dues ranging from $5,000 per year to
$16,000 per year. See Financial Services Technology Consortium, Join the FSTC Online
(visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.fstc.org/membership.html>.
116. Membership in BITS is limited to the 125 largest banks and thrifts in the U.S.
See The Banker's Roundtable, The Banker's Roundtable (visited Apr. 26, 1999)
<http://www.bankersround.org>.
117. See discussion supra, Part V.B.
118. Financial Services Technology Consortium, The Bank Internet Payment System
(BIPS): Leading the Way to Electronic Commerce (visited Apr. 26, 1999)
<http://www.fstc.org/projects/bips/>.
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pilot projects. The very large number of other putative standards-setting
organizations competing within the electronic payment services market
has reduced the probability that any one organization's standard would
achieve universal acceptance and recognition, and so enjoy the leverage
that the network effects of such standardization would provide. 
119
VII. CONCLUSION
Two years after the publication of the Magaziner Report, its recom-
mendation that regulators refrain from regulating until a need has been
established appears to have been sound even when applied to electronic
payment systems. The more utopian projections for the future of electronic
payment systems have not yet been realized, and the more dire threats to
regulated payment systems have not yet materialized. In 1999, the market
is dominated by traditional financial intermediaries offering conventional
electronic payment services augmented with minor innovations to adapt to
the Internet.
In the original myth of the clash of the Titans, the Titans first came to
power with the assistance of Mother Earth in their struggle to overthrow
Uranus. The Titan Cronus's efforts to forestall his eventual overthrow
were doomed to fail in the face of Mother Earth's support for the Olympi-
ans, and resulted only in postponement of the inevitable. In the battle for
dominance of the electronic payment systems market, the Titans are
clearly still in command and, at least in the U.S., the developers of alter-
native technologies have yet to establish much of a beachhead. This is far
from the final outcome, however, as innovative payment technologies may
become established outside the U.S. first, and then capitalize on their po-
sition in global markets to reenter the U.S. market on more favorable
terms in the future. In addition, innovators may succeed in hollowing out
the economic value of the basic payment system franchise, if the services
provided by regulated financial intermediaries become more constrained
and commodified, and competitors gain control of novel interfaces or de-
livery mechanisms that narrow the services the payment systems Titans
offer.
119. For a list of various electronic payment standard setting initiatives, see European
Union Open Information Interchange, Electronic Payment Mechanisms (visited Apr. 26,
1999) <http://www2.echo.lu/oii/en/payment.html>. For a collection of web resources
relating to electronic payment issues, see American Bar Association, ABA Electronic
Financial Services Subcommittee Home Page (visited Apr. 26, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/efss/home.html>.
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Consumers have shown a high degree of rationality in their choice of
electronic payment systems, and have stayed away from more risky or less
favorable innovations. Regulated electronic payment systems offer inci-
dental attributes such as float, or reversibility in the event of dispute. Con-
sumers may migrate toward regulated systems because they provide these
incidental benefits without regard to how well systemic risk issues are
managed. But so long as regulators guarantee the provision of both, then
consumers can migrate toward the most favorable package of rights and
obligations and the system will enjoy the oversight necessary to keep sys-
temic risk to manageable levels.
Consumer resistance to radical innovation is hard to interpret, but it is
possible that this resistance is based in part on some understanding of the
benefits consumers currently enjoy under existing systems and are un-
willing to surrender without some equivalent benefit. New systems that
provide a big boost to the electronic payment service provider, a marginal
benefit to the merchant and negligible benefits to the consumer are failing,
while existing electronic payment systems that preserve existing benefits
are prospering with only small modifications.
If regulated financial intermediaries continue to meet the demand for
electronic payment services through incremental innovations in estab-
lished services developed under the scrutiny of regulators, then emerging
payment systems do not pose as much of a threat to existing payment sys-
tems or the economy generally as once feared. Regulators will have the
time they need to gauge the real risk posed by innovation to existing sys-
tems and to adapt existing regulations to carry forward an equivalent level
of protection in new systems.
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